THE LAW RULING THE MOVEABLES OF AMER-ICANS MARRIED IN FRANCE OR IN BELGIUM WITHOUT ANY SETTLEMENT OR MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Which law governs the moveables of an American married in France or in Belgium," without making a marriage contract or any settlement whatever? The question at issue becomes of great importance, whenever an American lady marries a Frenchman or a Belgian.
I. According to American and English jurisprudence, the law of the domicil of the husband at the time of the marriage (or the intended domicil) determines the mutual rights of husband and wife to each other's moveables, whether possessed at the time of the marriage or acquired afterwards, without reference to the law where the marriage has been celebrated, or to the law of the country where the marriage is celebrated, or where the wife is domiciled before marriage.
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II. By section 14oo of the Code Civil-which is the statute law of Belgium (and was the law of the Rhine provinces in Germany, but no longer since 19oo), there begins from the time of the marriage, between husband and wife, married without a marriage contract, a Communio bonorum, ruled by sections 14Ol to 1496 inclusive, of the said Code Civil.
By section 14Ol, it is expressly stipulated that all moveables, any interest of invested capital, bonds or shares whatever, all rents, income and returns of real estate, even any real estate whatever acquired during coverture by husband or wife, shall fall into the said community of goods (communautW de biens).
By section 1421, the husband is the only manager and owner of such property. Therefore, he alone has a right to dispose of it at will, and even without the consent of his wife.
By section 1428, the separate property of the wife is even subject to the power and right of administration of the husband; he can sue in her own rights and on her behalf, but he cannot dispose of her real estate without his wife's consent.
III. According to the rules of private international law, as administered by French and Belgian Courts, where there is no marriage contract, or settlement, the mutual rights of Americans (husband and wife) married in France or in Belgium, to each others moveables, whether possessed at the time of the marriage or acquired afterwards, are determined by the law of the husband's actual domicil at the time of the marriage or the intended domicil, usually called matrimonial domicil. This means the husband's domicil is to prevail, when both parties have not the same one.
IV. The place where marriage is celebrated is of no moment in itself, whenevei it appears from circumstances, parties intend to establish their home somewhere else. It might, under certain circumstances (whenever there exists some doubt about the actual or intended domicil),;be important in order to find out or prove said domicil or intention.
A, an American citizen, domiciled in New York, marries in Paris, B, a French woman, domiciled in France, with the intention to go and live in New York. The rights of the parties to moveables are governed by the law of the State of New York.
A, an American citizen, domiciled in New York, marries in London, B, a French woman, domiciled in France, with the intention to go and live in New York. The rights of the parties to moveables are governed by the law of the State of New York.
A, an American citizen, formerly domiciled in New York, marries in Paris, B, a French woman, with the intention to go and live in London, where they establish their home. The rights of the parties to moveables are governed by the law of England.
V. The actual domicil is of great importance, usually it is conclusive proof for the clear intention of both parties regarding the law which should rule their mutual rights to moveables. However, when indisputable facts show a decided intention to make choice of a matrimonial domicil in another country than the husband's actual domicil, such importance ceases to be conclusive and gives way to the intended domicil.
This prevailing view, the doctrine of tacit contract to regulate the rights of husband and wife to their moveables, either possessed at the time of marriage or acquired afterwards, in cases where there is no express contract, is a principle laid down by ancient French jurists, namely by Charles Dumoulin. It seemed to be and was held as a well-established principle in French jurisprudence, a principle to last forever.
But, as Emerson writes, there is, no outside, no wall, no circumference to us. Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new series (On circles). This applies to legislation and jurisprudence as well as to any other branch of science or part of human activity and labour.
To ascertain parties' intentions, such as they existed in a long past time, proved, in many cases tried by French and Belgian Courts, to be a matter of the highest difficulty.
VI. "Voici comment j'expliquerais les dispositions l6gales en cette mati6re: la loi qui organise la famille et r~git les rapports personnels de ses membres r~gle aussi les rapports p6cunaires; ce r6glement n'est pas imp~ratif, en ce sens que les parties peuvent lui en substituer un autre, mais il s'impose toutes les fois qu'elles n'ont pas exprim6 r6guli~rement une intention contraire. Ma conclusion serait donc que la loi nationale du mari, qui r~git les rapports des 6poux, d~termine en m~me temps le r~gime sons lequel ius sont marius, en l'absence de stipulations formelles." 3 According to some lawyers and jurists, the view of tacit contract is not in conformity with facts; few married people ever think of it; according to M. Renault, as quoted hereabove, it is sometimes nonsense.
VII. A clear, definite test, easily applied, might become a sounder criterion of civil rights than past intention or domicil; they advocated the principle of nationality applicable as a law ruling moveables just as it is governing status and capacity. Now some explanation on the rise and growth of the principle of allegiance or nationality, may be of some interest, and this will lead to understand how the new doctrine was at once favored by many jurists and some judges.
VIII. In the majority of European countries, allegiance or political nationality is the proper test of civil rights. Lo stato e la capacit delle persone ed i rapporti di farniglia sono regolati dalla legge della nazione a cui esse appartengono; "the status and the capacity of persons and family relations are regulated by the law of the nation to which they belong."(Art. 6, Codice Civile.)
The Spanish Code of 1889 has followed Italy: Las leyes relativas a los derechos y deberes de familia o al estado, condicion y capacidad legal de las personas obligan a los espanoles aunque residan en pais extranjero; "the laws concerning the rights and duties or the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding Spanairds even residing in a foreign country." (Art. 9,
Codigo Civil) .'
The German Code of igoo has substituted the same principle for the law of domicil:6 "Die Geschiiftsfdhigkeit einer Person qvird nach den Gesetzen des Staates beurteilt, dem die Person angeh~rt; "the capacity of a person is determined by the laws of the State to which the person belongs." (Art. 7, IX. The principle of nationality generally applies all over Europe, when the United Kingdom stands alone and keeps to the law of domicil.
Spain and Germany made it a rule governing moveables by default of marriage contract. In France, the Court of Cassation It may be the view to be generally taken by the Courts in the next future; it is undoubtedly the direction given by this slow but continuous and decided evolution of doctrine and jurisprudence.
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